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The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Mental 
Life
A Commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling
Aaron Gutknecht
With  their  “bottom-up”  approach,  Holk  Cruse  and  Malte  Schilling  present  a
highly intriguing perspective on those mental phenomena that have fascinated hu-
mankind since ancient times. Among them are those aspects of our inner lives that
are at the same time most salient and yet most elusive: we are conscious beings
with complex emotions, thinking and acting in pursuit of various goals. Starting
with, from a biological point of view, very basic abilities, such as the ability to
move and navigate in an unpredictable environment, Cruse & Schilling have de-
veloped, step-by-step, a robotic system with the ability to plan future actions and,
to a limited extent, to verbally report on its own internal states. The authors then
offer a compelling argument that their system exhibits aspects of various higher-
level mental phenomena such as emotion, attention, intention, volition, and even
consciousness. 
The scientific investigation of the mind is faced with intricate problems at a
very fundamental, methodological level. Not only is there a good deal of concep-
tual vagueness and uncertainty as to what the explananda precisely are, but it is
also unclear what the best strategy might be for addressing the phenomena of in-
terest.  Cruse  &  Schilling’s  bio-robotic  “bottom-up”  approach  is  designed  to
provide answers to such questions. In this commentary, I begin, in the first section,
by presenting the main ideas behind this approach as I understand them. In the
second section, I turn to an examination of its scope and limits. Specifically, I will
suggest a set of constraints on good explanations based on the bottom-up ap-
proach. What criteria do such explanations have to meet in order to be of real sci-
entific value? I maintain that there are essentially three such criteria: biological
plausibility, adequate matching criteria, and transparency. Finally, in the third
section, I offer directions for future research, as Cruse & Schilling’s bottom-up ap-
proach is well suited to provide new insights in the domain of social cognition and
to explain its relation to phenomena such as language, emotion, and self. 
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1 Biorobotics and the bottom-up 
approach to mental life
From my perspective, there are two basic ideas
underlying the overall  research strategy enter-
tained by Cruse and Schilling. The first is that
in order to understand a system and its proper-
ties, it has to be reinvented or reconstructed by
the researcher. The second is that mental phe-
nomena may arise  as  emergent properties  via
the interaction of low-level components of a sys-
tem. I’d like to first provide an outline of these
basic ideas and the underlying strategy as I un-
derstand them. In the next section, I will critic-
ally  evaluate what types of  questions  the ap-
Gutknecht, A. (2015). The “Bottom-Up” Approach to Mental Life - A Commentary on Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 9(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570474 1 | 10
www.open-mind.net
proach is best suited to answer, and what kind
of problems it will likely face.
The first of the two main ideas is central to
the research area of bio-robotics. If we are able
to create an artificial system that exhibits the
phenomena of interest, we should be a great deal
closer  to  understanding  how these  phenomena
come about in nature. In order for this approach
to lead to valid conclusions, however, the process
of reconstruction has to do justice to the systems
we are seeking to understand. In the present con-
text we are concerned, above all, with humans
and other animals. This means that the way the
artificial system achieves the desired results has
to be biologically plausible, i.e., it has to be reas-
onable to assume that the capacities of the or-
ganism  that  we  are  trying  to  understand  are
really based on similar mechanisms. In this vein,
Cruse &  Schilling (this collection) are realising
the  basic  reactive  modules  of  their  system in
form of artificial neural networks that were in-
spired  by  biological  research  on,  for  instance,
stick  insects  (Walknet)  and  desert  ants  (Nav-
inet). 
The second of  the basic  ideas derives its
plausibility from an evolutionary perspective on
psychological  faculties.  Emotion,  attention,  the
ability  to  plan  future  actions,  and  any  other
“higher-level” capacities, including consciousness,
did not arise suddenly from one generation to
the next and independently of pre-existing, more
fundamental abilities, such as the ability to con-
trol one’s own body and respond adaptively to
environmental stimuli. Rather these latter abilit-
ies and the interactions between the mechanisms
responsible for them might well have been cru-
cial for mental properties to evolve. From this
perspective, the idea of reconstructing the evolu-
tionary process by starting with basic reactive
structures and examining how through the inter-
action of these structures unexpected properties
might  emerge seems very promising.  Since hu-
mans also gradually evolved from simpler organ-
isms, it is natural to assume that the same de-
pendence  between  reactive  structures  and
“higher-level” phenomena is present in our case
as  well.  The  investigation  of  this  dependence
might thus provide new insights into the mech-
anisms underlying human psychology.
But what does it mean exactly to say that
a property emerges from basic structures? What
is an emergent property? The philosophical con-
troversies surrounding the concept of emergence
date back over a hundred years and although
usage of the term has become increasingly pop-
ular in recent years, among both philosophers
and scientist, it can hardly be said to have one
universal definition. Rather, there are numerous
and varied interpretations, a fact which inevit-
ably  leads  to  confusion and misunderstanding
(for  a  good  overview  see  O’Connor &  Wong
2012). It is thus vital to identify precisely what
is meant by emergence in any particular case.
Notwithstanding this inherent ambiguity, there
seems,  however,  to  be  a  shared  idea  behind
much talk  of  emergent  properties:  this  is  the
idea that as systems become increasingly com-
plex  they  tend  to  exhibit  certain  higher-level
properties, which are novel or unexpected given
their simpler, lower-level, components.
Depending  on  how  this  claim  is  inter-
preted it can have more or less serious implica-
tions  regarding  the  fundamental  structure  of
nature, as well as the structure of science. In or-
der to obtain a particularly strong and at the
same time highly influential reading, it must be
understood in a two-fold sense. First, as mean-
ing that these properties cannot  even in prin-
ciple be predicted or explained on the basis of
the  lower-level  properties  of  the  system  and,
second,  as  indicating that  such properties  are
associated  with  genuinely  new  causal  powers,
i.e., they make a real difference to the run of
events and are not mere epiphenomena (for dis-
cussion  see  Kim 1999,  2006).1 This  kind  of
emergence  could  be  called  strong  emergence.2
Central  to  this  conception  is  that  emergent
properties causally influence the simpler entities
from whose organisation they emerge. This sort
of causal influence is called “downward causa-
tion”, as emergent properties are conceived as
1 Such conceptions go back to thinkers such as Samuel Alexander, C.
L. Morgan, and C. D. Broad, prominent figures in a philosophical
movement, which came to be known as “British emergentism”. The
following discussion is, however, intended to illustrate the problem-
atic nature of the concept of emergence and not to offer an analysis
of the ideas of a particular philosophical school. 
2 It should be noted that the there is no universal definition of the
term “strong emergence” in the current literature (for some alternat-
ive characterisations see Chalmers 2006; Bedau 1997; Yates 2013).
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higher-level  properties  arising  from  certain
lower-level properties and relations. Typically, it
is assumed that what we find at the lowest level
of this hierarchy are the properties and relations
of fundamental physical particles. Given this as-
sumption, the existence of emergent properties
would entail that a complete description of the
fundamental physical organisation of a system
might  still  leave  something  out.  The  system
might still have some properties that could not
be predicted on the basis of such a description
and could not be explained in terms of the or-
ganisation  of  its  basic  physical  constituents.
Moreover,  because  emergent  properties  are
causally  efficacious,  knowledge  of  the  basic
physical components of a system and their be-
haviour may not be sufficient to predict the fu-
ture evolution of the system. These considera-
tions seem to lead to the conclusion that the
meta-scientific  thesis,  according  to  which  all
phenomena can ultimately be explained by the
fundamental laws of physics, would turn out to
be false. If certain properties belonging to the
domains  of  psychology,  biology,  or  chemistry
were emergent properties, these could not even
in principle be captured by basic physics alone.
All  sciences  dealing  with  genuinely  emergent
properties  would  remain  completely  autonom-
ous,  positing  their  own independent laws and
explanations.  Furthermore,  since  emergent
properties have the ability to causally influence
lower-level  entities,  the  fundamental  laws  of
physics would not even suffice to explain pro-
cesses taking place at the physical level (see also
Chalmers 2006).
These  are  substantial  conclusions  that
could be met with some scepticism. They are
also one of the reasons for the fierce controversy
surrounding the concept of emergence. Further-
more,  the  condition  that  emergent  properties
are themselves causally efficacious and the gen-
eral  idea  of  “downward  causation”  leads  to
problems in and of itself. This is because there
has  to  be  a  systematic  relationship  between
emergent  and  lower-level  properties,  even
though  they  are  conceived  as  being  distinct
from another. Often this is expressed by saying
that  emergent  properties  are  completely  de-
termined by lower-level properties and require
them for their existence. In other words, if all
lower-level properties of a system are fixed, its
emergent properties are also fixed; and without
any appropriate lower-level properties, a system
cannot have emergent properties. If this weren’t
the  case,  it  would  be  unclear  in  what  sense
emergent  properties  emerge from lower-level
ones (Kim 2006). If their relationship were com-
pletely coincidental, this would surely be an in-
appropriate description. 
Based  on  this  requirement,  Kim (1999,
2006) has put forth an influential argument that
the idea of “downward causation” is untenable.
In summary, Kim’s basic argument is this: sup-
pose an emergent property (let’s say a feeling of
thirst) causes a lower-level property (e.g., a cer-
tain activation pattern N in the brain). If feel-
ing thirsty is an emergent property, there have
to  be  appropriate  lower-level  properties  from
which  it  emerges.  Let’s  call  these  the  “emer-
gence base” of feeling thirsty. Now, that feeling
thirsty causes N means that there is a natural
law that  occurrences  of  feeling thirsty are al-
ways  followed  by  occurrences  of  N  (feeling
thirsty  is  nomologically  sufficient  for  N).  But
since  occurrences  of  feeling thirsty are always
accompanied  by  occurrences  of  its  emergence
base, it must also be true that occurrences of its
emergence base are followed by occurrences of
N.  Therefore,  if  feeling  thirsty  causes  N,  its
emergence base also causes N. But this makes
feeling thirsty completely redundant as a cause
of N. Its emergence base is completely sufficient
to explain Ns occurrence, leaving the feeling of
thirst as a mere epiphenomenon. Since this ex-
ample can easily be generalised, one can con-
clude that there are no genuine cases of down-
ward causation and hence no genuine emergent
properties of the type presently under consider-
ation.
In summary, it can be stated that emer-
gence  is  a  highly  controversial  concept—not
only because of its inherent ambiguity, but also
on account of certain varieties of emergentism
that  have  substantial  metaphysical  and meta-
scientific implications as well as a commitment
to the problematic idea of downward causation.
The  crucial  questions  remaining  now  are
whether  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)
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provide a clear interpretation of the concept of
emergence and whether it provokes the kind of
controversy and criticism outlined above. What
kind of emergence is involved in their claim that
mental states might be construed as emergent
properties?  In  fact,  they  provide  two  slightly
different  characterisations.  According  to  the
first, an emergent property is to be understood
as a property of a whole system that cannot, at
first sight, be traced back to the interactions of
the  systems  components.  Alternatively,  one
might say that we cannot, at first sight, predict
the  emergent  properties  of  a  complex  system
based on our knowledge of its parts and their
interaction. Thus, we might be genuinely sur-
prised that the system in question exhibits such
properties. Emergence in this sense is sometimes
called  weak emergence  (Chalmers 2006). If this
is all that it means for a system to have emer-
gent properties, few would raise serious objec-
tions.  This  sort  of  emergence  is  just  a  con-
sequence of our limited knowledge and cognitive
capacities and is relative to the judging subject:
what might not be immediately predictable for
one person might be just so for another. Emer-
gentism, in this sense, has no far-reaching meta-
physical  or  meta-scientific  implications  and  is
not committed to any sort of “downward causa-
tion”.
Cruse & Schilling (this collection) provide
a second, and equally unproblematic, definition
of emergence that is specifically tailored for ap-
plication in the context of robotics. According
to that definition, a property of an artificially
constructed system is emergent if it was not ex-
plicitly implemented by its designers. We might
call this  implementational emergence. This ap-
pears to be relatively independent of the sort of
“weak” emergence I’ve just  described.  Even a
property  not  explicitly  implemented  might  be
predictable without too much effort, whereas a
property deliberately implemented might not be
predictable, at least by persons lacking experi-
ence or competence. I  think that most of the
emergent properties Cruse & Schilling (this col-
lection)  attribute  to  their  artificial  system,
reaCog, match both characterisations: they were
neither explicitly implemented nor would we im-
mediately expect or predict that reaCog would
exhibit them. At the same time, the properties
in question are highly interesting and are not
simply insignificant side effects. This is import-
ant since, according to the definitions provided
by Cruse & Schilling, the claim that an artificial
system exhibits emergent properties is,  in and
of itself, not particularly notable. But this de-
pends entirely on what the emergent properties
in  question  precisely  are.  The  finding  that
reaCog exhibits, in this way, aspects of psycho-
logical characteristics, such as emotion or atten-
tion and the ability to perform non-trivial body
movements,  are most certainly of  considerable
scientific significance. In conclusion, we may say
that although the kind of emergentism advoc-
ated  by Cruse  & Schilling does  not  have  the
same far-reaching  implications  as  the particu-
larly demanding conception outlined above, it is
nonetheless useful and philosophically interest-
ing. This is because it functions as the basis of
an intriguing approach to the study of psycholo-
gical properties, which I shall now endeavour to
describe.
Combining the idea of emergence with the
idea,  outlined  above,  that  in  order  to  under-
stand a system and its properties, it has to be
reinvented or reconstructed, we arrive at a fas-
cinating research strategy.  The first  step con-
sists in observing the behaviour of animals that,
although lacking many of the sophisticated abil-
ities with which humans are endowed, are non-
etheless  capable  of  flexibly  controlling  their
bodies in order to cope with an unpredictable
environment (such as stick insects, desert ants,
and honey bees).  Based on these observations
one then develops a neural network model (e.g.,
Walknet  or  Navinet)  designed to  produce  the
behaviour observed in the first step. Next, this
model is realised in an artificial system (either
virtual or robotic) in order to examine to what
extent  the  behaviour  produced  by  the  model
matches the behaviour of the biological organ-
ism on which it is based. If it resembles it to a
great extent, this can be taken as  prima facie
evidence  that  the  mechanisms  underlying  the
behaviour are the same for the animal and the
robot. Different modules that are constructed in
this way are then integrated into a holistic sys-
tem. Further modules might be added step-by-
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step  (e.g.,  Body  Model,  Attention-Controller,
Word-Nets). The result is a complex system (in
the present case “reaCog”) the behaviour and
properties of which cannot be easily predicted
even by its very own designers. The last, and
most  important  step  consists  of  examining
whether  the system shows characteristics  that
were  not  explicitly  implemented  but  instead
arise from the dynamic interactions of the sys-
tem’s components. The most intriguing question
in this context is, of course, whether the final
system shows aspects of those phenomena that
are constitutive of having a mind.
Although this is only a rough sketch of the
methodology entertained by  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection), I hope I have captured the es-
sential  points  sufficiently  to  proceed  with  an
evaluation of its scope and the possible prob-
lems it might face. What kind of questions is
the bottom-up approach best suited to answer?
Which  phenomena  or  processes  can  be  ad-
dressed  by  research  based  on  this  approach?
What considerations have to be taken into ac-
count  in  order  for  the  presented  research
strategy to be successful? Are there any general
constraints bio-robotic bottom-up explanations
have to meet? As we shall see, the answers to
these last two question are directly connected to
two characteristics of the research strategy out-
lined in the previous paragraph: first, that it in-
volves, at two points, a comparison of the beha-
viour  of  significantly  different  systems  and,
second,  that  it  is  specifically designed to dis-
cover emergent properties.
2 The bottom-up approach: Objectives, 
benefits and constraints
2.1 Mechanisms and the evolution of the 
mind 
The most important aspect of the proposed ap-
proach is that it helps to elucidate the mechan-
isms underlying various mental properties. This
is possible because many of the basic features of
the control system reaCog are known. Using the
words of  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection), it
constitutes  a  “quantitatively  defined  system”.
As  all  components  are  realised  as  artificial
neural networks, all information about the num-
ber of neurons, the connection weights between
them, and the way individual neurons process
information is available. More importantly, how-
ever,  the  basic  functional  architecture  of  the
system is well understood. Which modules are
connected in which ways to other modules, how
they receive their input, and what other parts
of the system might be affected by their outputs
does not have to be figured out by painstaking
investigation—as  is  the  case  in  biological  re-
search.  Because  these  facts  about  reaCog  are
known, it is possible to provide detailed mech-
anism descriptions. In this way, reaCog’s ability
to plan its future actions by internal simulation
can be explained by reference to the interaction
of its various sub-modules: a problem detector
is activated when sensory input indicates that
current behaviour will lead, if continued, to ad-
verse effects for the system (e.g., falling over).
This leads to the abortion of current behaviour
and  activation  in  the  Spreading  Activation
Layer,  which  randomly  excites  the  Winner-
Takes-All network (WTA-net). After some time,
the WTA-net adopts a relaxed state in which
only one of its units is active. This active unit
in turn stimulates its counterpart in the Motiva-
tion  Unit  Network,  leading  to  activity  of  the
corresponding  reactive  procedures.  These
provide motor output that can be redirected to
the body model, which then simulates the exe-
cution of the proposed behaviour and predicts
its  likely consequences.  If  the system predicts
that the problem will persist, the process of in-
ternal  simulation  goes  on  until  a  solution  is
found, which can then be used to control the
actual movements of the system. 
Explanations like these contain a lot of in-
formation about which functional subparts of a
system are engaged during the exercise of the
ability  in  question.  In  this  particular  case  it
makes clear  how the ability to plan ahead,  a
cognitive ability, depends heavily on basic react-
ive structures that are designed to control spe-
cific leg movements as well as an internal model
of the body. The same is true for various other
capacities  like attention  and Theory of  Mind.
Thus,  new  insights  into  the  mechanisms  re-
sponsible for those phenomena in humans could
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be gained by considering how body models and
motor  control  mechanisms are  realised  in  our
case and how these systems interact. In other
words,  the  bottom-up  approach  may  lead  to
new  directions  for  future  research  concerning
human  psychology  by  suggesting  how specific
functional  modules  interact  in  order  to  bring
about a particular target phenomenon. Whether
this approach is tenable depends on the degree
to which findings pertaining to the artificial sys-
tem might legitimately be used to draw conclu-
sions  about  human  beings.  I  will  propose  a
number of constraints to ensure that this condi-
tion is fulfilled below.
Another class of questions that a bottom-
up strategy is well designed to answer has to do
with the evolution of  cognitive capacities:  how
did cognitive systems evolve from purely reactive
systems? How did emotions, attention, or even
consciousness arise? What are the natural pre-
cursors of these phenomena?  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection) show convincingly that no com-
pletely new neural modules are needed in order
for  such  properties  to  occur.  Rather,  minor
changes in the basic architecture might suffice to
generate radical extensions of the abilities of a
system. In this  way,  a  reactive system with a
body model can acquire the ability to plan ahead
if it is able to disconnect its motor system from
the physical body and instead send the motor
signals  to  its  internal  body  model.  No  novel
“planning module”  is  needed.  Already existing
modules just have to become dissociable and can
thus acquire new functions (Cruse 2003). In ad-
dition, the target paper suggests an answer to
the question of the evolutionary function of cog-
nition understood as the ability to plan ahead: it
was the necessity of being able to control a com-
plex body in a complex environment that made
this ability highly valuable. Detecting problems
by perception, finding innovative solutions by in-
ternal simulation and acting on them are capa-
cities that are extremely advantageous for any
organism possessing a body with a high number
of  redundant  degrees  of  freedom  (see  Cruse
2003). This is in line with, and actually extends,
the widespread assumption that the evolutionary
function  of  cognition  is  to  deal  with  environ-
mental complexity (Godfrey-Smith 2002).
2.2 Constraints on bio-robotic bottom-up 
explanations
In  the  previous  paragraph  we  saw  that  the
framework  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)
present  is  well-equipped  to  give  new  insights
into the underlying mechanisms of psychological
phenomena and the evolution of  cognition, as
well as a promising approach to creating highly
flexible and intelligent robots. There are, how-
ever, some problems the proposed strategy has
to face, especially if the control structures be-
come increasingly complex. I therefore want to
suggest a set of three constraints on good bot-
tom-up explanations of biological/psychological
phenomena.
1. Adequate  matching  criteria:3 At  two  points
the research strategy described in section 1
involves a comparison between the behaviour
of an artificial system on the one hand and a
biological system on the other. First, this is
the case in  the development of  neural  net-
work  models  of  animal  behaviour.  In  this
context, the comparison is used to ascertain
whether the proposed model of the mechan-
isms underlying certain capacities (e.g., walk-
ing) really reproduces the original behaviour
of the animal (e.g.,  a stick insect). Second,
there is a similar process of comparison in-
volved  in  the  application  of  psychological
concepts to the complete system. At different
points in their discussion,  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection) argue that their system has
certain mental capacities because it exhibits
behaviour (or would exhibit it if certain ex-
tensions  were  implemented)  connected  to
those  mental  capacities  in  humans.  So,  for
example, just as the performance of athletes
might  worsen if  they consciously  attend to
what they are doing, the activation of the at-
tention  controller  in  reaCog  can  lead  to
poorer results compared to unimpeded execu-
tion of the reactive procedures.
Both processes of comparison require criteria
to identify when the behaviour of the artifi-
cial system and that of the biological system
3 I credit this term to Datteri & Tamburrini 2007.
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are relevantly similar, i.e., similar enough in
order to provide evidence for the claim that
similar mechanisms are at work in both cases
or that the artificial  system and the biolo-
gical system share certain psychological char-
acteristics (Datteri & Tamburrini 2007). The
difficulty of finding such criteria increases the
more the bodies of the compared systems dif-
fer. In some cases they might nonetheless be
easy  to  find  and  relatively  uncontroversial.
This, however, is not always the case. For in-
stance, in their discussion of emotions—and
more specifically the emotion of happiness—,
Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)  suggest
that by increasing the threshold of the prob-
lem detector reaCog would take more risks,
thus behaving similarly to humans when they
are happy. Now, the question is whether the
kind of risky behaviour exhibited by reaCog
when the threshold of its problem detector is
increased is the same kind of risky behaviour
humans exhibit when they are happy. Only if
this condition is fulfilled can the similarity be
taken as evidence that reaCog shows aspects
of the emotion of happiness. 
2. Biological plausibility: Any proposed mechan-
ism should  be  biologically  plausible,  i.e.,  it
has to be reasonable to assume that the ca-
pacities of the organism that we are trying to
understand are really based on such a mech-
anism. This can, at least to some degree, be
ensured  by  trying  to  create  similarities
between the artificial and the biological or-
ganism on  a  basic  structural  level,  for  ex-
ample  by  using  artificial  neural  networks.
Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  to  decide  how
fine-grained the model should be. Should the
model take brain structures, neurons, or sub-
cellular elements as its basic building blocks?
Should intracellular processes be neglected or
are  they  important?  The  answer  will  of
course  always  be  relative  to  our  particular
epistemic  goals.  Finally,  there  are  different
options regarding the way artificial  neurons
process information, i.e., how they calculate
their output value depending on the weighted
sum of their inputs. All these factors might
turn out to be important if the results are to
be  used  to  infer  biological  mechanisms.
The  requirement  of  biological  plausibility
shouldn’t, however, be overemphasised. Cruse
&  Schilling (this collection) stress that they
are not trying to present a realistic model of
neuronal activity in living organisms. Hence,
they are using biologically implausible, non-
spiking  artificial  neurons  as  the  basic  ele-
ments of their architecture, while noting that
some authors (referring to Singer 1995) have
located the neural basis of consciousness in
synchronously  oscillating  spikes.  This,  how-
ever, is not a weighty objection to the pro-
posed approach since it is designed as a func-
tional approach. The question is: how do dif-
ferent functional subsystems like a system for
controlling  the  swing-movement  of  a  leg,  a
system  modelling  the  robot’s  body,  and  a
system allowing for the selection of different
internal  states  interact in order to produce
certain emergent phenomena? Therefore, the
concrete physical realisation of these subsys-
tems is of only secondary importance.
3. Transparency:4 Doubts about the strategy of
using  artificial  systems  in  order  to  under-
stand biological systems arise because even if
we were to create an extremely intelligent ro-
bot, it would not necessarily help us to un-
derstand the mechanisms underlying its intel-
ligence. Rather, we might be faced with yet
another complex system whose workings we
do  not  understand  (Holland &  Goodman
2003). Now, the approach  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection)  present  is  specifically  de-
signed to discover  emergent  properties,  i.e.,
properties that were not explicitly implemen-
ted. This means that there will be a high risk
of finding properties in the complete system
that cannot be readily provided with a clear-
cut mechanistic explanation involving the co-
operation  of  the  system’s  components.  Al-
though the explanations of the occurrence of
various psychological properties presented in
the present paper are quite convincing, the
4 The concept of transparency has a number of other well-established
interpretations in the literature that should not be confused with the
one at issue in the present context. These include, for example, “se-
mantic” (Clark 1989) and “phenomenal” (Metzinger 2004) transpar-
ency.
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bottom-up strategy might eventually exhaust
its potential if the complexity of the system
is further increased. 
3 Future perspectives: The social insect
I would like to conclude by briefly proposing a
perspective for future research based on the sys-
tem reaCog. As presented, its ability to interact
and cooperate with other agents is fairly restric-
ted. At the same time, the pre-requisites of a
broader social extension of the system seem to
be in place.  The present paper already shows
how reaCog could be equipped with the capacit-
ies to recognize the behaviour of others and ap-
ply  a  Theory  of  Mind.  In  their  2011 paper,
Cruse &  Schilling further propose that by im-
plementing a two-body model (a “We-model”)
reaCog might be capable of cooperative beha-
viour  using shared goals.  Integration and fur-
ther  expansion  of  such  social  capacities,  and
their  application  in  an  actual  robot,  seems
promising considering the importance of social
interaction in processes such as language acquis-
ition and emotional regulation. Some have even
suggested that the presence of other agents in
the  environment,  or,  in  other  words,  dealing
with social complexity, was a dominant factor in
the evolution of sophisticated cognitive abilities
(Humphrey 1976). Thus bio-robotic research in
this direction might provide new insights into
the mechanisms underlying such developmental
and evolutionary processes.  Moreover,  a social
extension of reaCog might eventually shed light
on potential  emergent phenomena  on a group
level,  such  as  labour  division,  collective  plan-
ning,  social  hierarchies  and,  most  fundament-
ally, joint action coordination. What high-level
social phenomena emerge when multiple bio-ro-
botic  systems  like  reaCog  interact  with  each
other?
Cruse and Schilling’s system seems partic-
ularly  well-suited  to  further  illuminate  motor
theories of social cognition. According to such
theories, the important social cognitive capacity
of  understanding  another’s  actions  is  directly
linked to mechanisms that are active when the
observer performs similar actions  Gallese et al.
2004;  for  criticism  see  Jacob &  Jeannerod
2005).  The  underlying  neural  mechanism  has
come to be known as the mirror-neuron system.
Furthermore, there is evidence that the mirror-
neuron system plays a role in certain aspects of
self-consciousness.  For  instance,  Uddin  (2007;
see also Molnar-Szakacs & Uddin 2013) suggests
that this is the case for representations of the
physical self, and ascribes frontoparietal mirror-
neuron areas an important function for self-re-
cognition  (especially  the  recognition  of  one’s
own face). As mirroring mechanisms can be in-
tegrated in reaCog as well, this opens the pos-
sibility of further investigating motor theories of
social  cognition  and  the  relation  between  in-
ternal motor simulation and the self in a quant-
itatively defined system. 
An ability that is highly important for hu-
man social interaction is the ability to commu-
nicate  using  language.  At  this  point,  the  lin-
guistic capacities of reaCog still seem quite in-
flexible and limited in scope. A highly interest-
ing extension of this system would be to provide
it  with  the  means  to  learn  words  and  their
meanings  by  interaction  with  other  agents.
Some of the pre-requisites, like the ability to in-
ternally simulate the behaviour of others, could,
as Cruse and Schilling argue, be implemented in
reaCog by using its internal body-model to rep-
resent another agent. Robotic research in this
direction was performed by  Steels &  Spranger
(2009).  Their  artificial  systems are capable of
autonomously acquiring a simple language con-
sisting of words for specific body postures. After
learning  is  complete,  the  artificial  agents  are
able to reliably assume body postures on verbal
command by other agents. Since social learning
has  also  been  implicated  in  the  process  of
concept formation (Steels 2002),  the proposed
extension might also foster our understanding of
this intriguing phenomenon. 
4 Conclusion
In  conclusion  it  can  be  stated  that  Cruse &
Schilling (this collection) present a highly fas-
cinating  research  strategy  that  is  well  worth
pursuing. The bottom-up approach can provide
us with  new insights  regarding the  functional
mechanisms  underlying  psychological  phenom-
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ena and their evolution. Although the notion of
emergence  is  central  to  it,  Cruse &  Schilling
(this collection) avoid the philosophical contro-
versies surrounding this concept by interpreting
it in a less demanding, yet interesting and use-
ful way. There are, however, a number of con-
straints that explanations based on the bottom-
up approach have to meet. First, since Cruse &
Schilling’s (this collection) strategy involves, at
two points, a comparison between markedly dif-
ferent systems, criteria are needed according to
which we can determine whether the two sys-
tems  exhibit  relevantly  similar  behaviour.
Second, the structural architecture of the artifi-
cial  system must  have  an  adequate  degree  of
biological plausibility. And finally, it has to be
ensured that  increasing the complexity of  the
system does not lead to the practical impossibil-
ity of elucidating the mechanisms underlying its
emergent properties. 
A promising next step for bottom-up re-
search as presented by  Cruse &  Schilling (this
collection) would be to take it to the level of so-
cial interaction. An extensive social extension of
their system could shed light on a wide range of
intriguing phenomena. Is it possible to discover
emergent properties on a group level? In what
precise way are mirroring mechanisms involved
in social cognition? What role do such mechan-
isms play for the phenomenon of self-conscious-
ness? What role do reactive structures and in-
ternal body-models play in the processes of lan-
guage acquisition and comprehension? Of course
this is  only a small  selection of  the questions
further bio-robotic research might contribute to
answering.  Cruse &  Schilling (this collection)
made clear that starting from the bottom is a
strategy  with  enormous  scientific  significance.
There is no doubt that this work will make an
important contribution to a plethora of research
projects in the future.
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